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Gender and Welfare Regimes Revised. Connecting Danish and Chinese Perspectives
China and Denmark could hardly be more different cases for comparison: a huge developing
one-party state set against a small post-industrial plural state. Despite these significant and cate-
gorical differences, however, both states are faced with similar challenges when it comes to
changing demographic patterns, with more elderly persons in need of both care and support,
coupled with smaller working-age populations to deliver that care and support. Mapping and
comparing the combinations of welfare regarding care for the elderly in China and Denmark
reveals serious inequalities of class, gender and generation. Both states are in principle fully com-
mitted to the wellbeing of all citizens through universal welfare state protection, but in reality
both rely very much on market and civil society solutions, which leaves the population strongly
differentiated and polarized, not only when it comes to gender and generation, but also with
respect to class. The conclusion is that Denmark and China are converging towards a model of
welfare combinations set within an overall framework of universalism. The most important lines
of conflict revolve around generation, though class and gender also remain influential.
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This article situates Denmark
and China respectively within the Scandina-
vian and East Asian welfare regimes, thus
underlining the substantial differences
between the two. However, the discussion
of how support and care for the frail and
elderly is organized, financed and provided
reveals remarkable similarities between the
Chinese and Danish cases. Focusing on
gender and generation, class also serves as a
dividing line in both societies. Develop-
ments in Denmark are interesting from the
Chinese perspective, since they point to a
solution for the care deficit problem in
China, namely the introduction of publicly
financed and publicly regulated care.
Simultaneously, China is also interesting
from a Danish perspective, since it demon-
strates the issues involved in intergenera-
tional exchanges and solidarities, which are
also on the increase in Denmark. 
The article provides an overview of the
gender regime that prevails in post-revolu-
tion China, that is, since the creation of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. It
points out the persistent problems of
women’s inferior labor market positions
vis-à-vis men, which are exacerbated when
it comes to child birth, maternity leave and
care. By focusing on the most recent deve-
lopments in Shanghai, these problems are
illustrated in their most developed forms in
China. This is followed by a parallel discus-
sion of the organization of combinations of
welfare in Copenhagen with respect to care
for the elderly, highlighting the importance
of institutions in civil society and NGOs,
despite the strong traditional ideological
orientation towards the public sector.
The article concludes that Denmark and
China are converging towards a model of
welfare combinations set within an overall
framework of universalism. The most
important lines of conflict are identified as
revolving around generation, though class
and gender also remain influential.
WELFARE AND GENDER REGIMES,
EAST AND WEST
Denmark belongs to the so-called Scandi-
navian welfare regime, which is character-
ized by being universal, comprehensive,
financed through taxation, and as empha-
sizing public care services for children, the
disabled and the frail and elderly. These
conditions have enabled women to work
full time (or long-term part-time) and to
have children at the same time. Labor mar-
kets are highly organized, and wage varia-
tion is low. However, male employment is
biased toward the private sector, while
female employment is biased toward the
public sector, resulting in women having
lower incomes but more secure employ-
ment than men. Welfare spending is high,
but the comprehensive care services make it
possible to reconcile work and family life,
which results in an absolute fertility rate
close to 2.0. This scenario has been defined
as women-friendly, or at least as having
women-friendly potential (Hernes 1987).
Though backed by policies emphasizing
equal treatment, in everyday life women
still have more responsibilities than men for
providing care to family members and
keeping house (Borchorst 2012).
Following Ian Gough et al. (2004) and
Wood and Gough (2006), I previously sug-
gested that welfare regimes in southern
Europe, Latin America and East Asia have a
lot in common: all three regions are late
industrializers and late democratizers, and
they all have a long tradition, legally and
morally, of filial piety, meaning that the
eldest son of the family is responsible for
the well-being of elderly family members.
This responsibility for care often falls on
the wife and sisters of the eldest son.
Women work a lot, but mostly within the
informal sector, which does not necessarily
provide access to welfare benefits. The
states in these regions are all characterized
by being small spenders when it comes to
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social policy. Furthermore, with the excep-
tion of Latin America, women in these
regions also show low levels of fertility. As a
result, the label ‘informal care regime’ has
been attached to welfare states in these
regions (Abrahamson 2011). 
Concerning China, it is well known that
its development has been extremely rapid,
especially with respect to economic growth,
but more recently that has been the case
regarding social rights as well. Hence, from
a Scandinavian perspective it is of great
interest to observe China committing itself
to developing a universal welfare system in
the most recent five-year plan (China De-
velopment Research Foundation 2012). At
least on paper, the plan entails major
changes, especially compared to the period
following the opening up of the economy
in the late 1970s. Gradually, systems of
social protection have been established
through health, old-age insurance and
social assistance, while social service provi-
sion has remained rudimentary (Chan,
Ngok, Philips 2008; Kettunen, Kuhnle,
Ren 2014). This recent commitment to
universal social citizenship is strongly moti-
vated by a fear of declining social cohesion
because of the significant increases in social
inequality that have resulted from the mas-
sive, but unevenly distributed economic
growth.
GENERATIONS OF CARE: 
COMPARING CHINA AND DENMARK
Relationships between welfare and gender
regimes can be demonstrated with respect
to how care is produced and distributed in
society. Reflecting on the situation during
the 1980s and 1990s, the Danish and
Chinese cases could hardly be more differ-
ent. Denmark is seen as the realization of
the universal or Beveridge-style welfare
model developed during the 1980s and
onwards, characterized by a comprehensive
system of municipal care arrangements for
the elderly, as well as for other groups such
as young children. There exists a guarantee
of child care to all parents, ensuring that
they could have their child or children
taken care of in public nurseries, kinder-
gartens and after-school clubs. Universal
guarantees of care for the disabled have
also been continued and expanded. Hence,
parents are relieved of the care burden,
making it possible for Danish women both
to undertake labor market careers and to
retain the main responsibility for raising
children. Furthermore, financial transfers to
all families with children have been
increased over the same period, making it
easier, if still difficult, to raise children
(Abrahamson 2010). 
In general, social policy reforms have
come about on the basis of a wide range of
compromises and a high degree of consen-
sus in the Nordic countries, particularly
concerning family policy (Abrahamson
2014). As mentioned above, from one per-
spective this has led to the creation of a
women-friendly welfare state, which is
reflected in the relatively high levels of fer-
tility and can be seen as a victory for the
fight for equal treatment of men and
women. However, women in Scandinavia
still earn less than men and have less influ-
ential positions within labor hierarchies.
Hence, it can also be claimed that welfare
state arrangements have made it possible
for women to perform a double duty as
both mothers and workers.
The position regarding family policy and
women in China is different. For instance,
care for needy family members was a joint
responsibility organized by the eldest son in
accordance with more than 2000 years of
the Confucian principle of filial piety. His-
torically, this has been the dominant princi-
ple all over the world. From a reproductive
point of view, this functioned well as long
as families had many children, who stayed
at or close to home. However, this situa-
tion is being seriously challenged by two
major developments in today’s China,
namely internal migration and low fertility,
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the latter being a consequence of the one-
child policy and radical shift to urbaniza-
tion and migration. When generations live
thousands of kilometers apart, the practice
of filial piety becomes difficult since it must
rely on grown-up children caring for frail
parents from a distance, for instance, by
paying someone to perform this role. This
is only possible for families with a sufficient
financial surplus and certain levels of trust,
which, however, almost do not exist in
today’s China. Furthermore, when families
only have one child, it is not feasible for
one daughter or daughter-in-law to care for
(up to four) frail elderly parents, even if
they live within the same geographical area
(Abrahamson 2011). 
WOMEN AND WELFARE IN CHINA
The work unit or the collective farm acted
as a comprehensive system of support and
help in the early history of the People’s
Republic. However, following the reform
period from 1978 these systems broke
down, and the market was expected to be
as successful, if only for a while, regarding
welfare provision as it had proved to be in
distributing other items of consumption.
However, it became clear that market-led
welfare provision exacerbates societal
inequalities, hence it contributed to, rather
than reduced, the overall inequality in
Chinese society. Therefore, beginning with
the Asian financial crisis in 1998, China
started to develop comprehensive social
security systems in relation to health care
and old-age pensions. From 2007 a pro-
gram of universal social assistance was
established, and the problem of migrant
workers’ limited access to social services
was recognized: “In recent years, the
Chinese government seems to be question-
ing whether the ‘private welfare’ model
is the right path for China after all”
(Warnecke 2009: 6).
Thus, changing welfare regimes have
resulted in changing gender regimes in
China. Undoubtedly, the first period of the
People’s Republic, from 1949 to 1978,
meant a great leap forward for women’s
rights and the recognition of women, per-
haps not surprisingly, since it happened
against the backdrop of a traditional feudal
order. In urban areas, work units were
responsible for providing work and taking
care of those without the capacity to work
(the so-called ‘three no’s’), and provided
collective child care and cafeterias, which
eased the burden of domestic work.
In the post-socialist era, the gradual pri-
vatization of social security and inequalities
between men and women increased, since
entitlements now reflected labor market
participation and pay. Meanwhile, state-
owned enterprises were no longer able to
deliver social services and transfers, and
many were left without coverage, such as
pensions and unemployment benefits.
Gradually, and more intensively since the
Asian crisis of 1998, contributory social
security systems for old age and health care
were established, and now in the 2010s
they cover the great majority of the popula-
tion. But in general, contributory systems
favor men rather than women, because they
work longer hours, are better paid and are
allowed to work for more years. The last
issue is a consequence of the very low
retirement ages in China, particularly for
women, who are usually forced to retire at
50 or 55, while men retire at 60 (Chan,
Ngok, Philips 2008: 65). This low retire-
ment age is a mixed blessing, especially for
women. Many women never make it to
higher positions within labor market hierar-
chies, and therefore they have lower pen-
sions than men do. Furthermore, pension
funds are far from mature, meaning that
the compensation is very low. Hence, most
of the elderly in China are in practice still
dependent upon their family relatives.
Differences between men and women
are also reflected in the general develop-
ment of the Chinese labor market, with its
enormous internal migration since that
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marked was opened up, and the process is
becoming increasingly feminized. (Young)
women are recruited from the countryside
to work in factories or service jobs in the
cities and the so-called Special Economic
Zones, the export-processing zones.
Regarding social citizenship, migrant
workers experience the effects of the
socalled hokou system of spatial registration,
which divides the Chinese population into
two groups, depending on whether they
live in rural or urban areas: one can only
receive welfare entitlements where one is
registered, meaning that migrant workers
cannot exercise their social rights at their
place of work, including schooling for their
children (Warnecke 2009: 12). This situa-
tion is gradually changing, and some
measures have now been adopted in the
direction of a more flexible form of citizen-
ship, while certain migrant facilities have
also been allowed to establish themselves
outside the factories.
On paper, women are protected and given
rights in connection with child birth, but in
reality: there is evidence to suggest that
women are increasingly pressured to defer
marriage and childbirth in order to retain
jobs. Due to the lack of labor law enforce-
ment, when women (particularly rural    
migrant women) become pregnant, it is 
simply easier to substitute them with replace-
ment workers rather than pay them maternity
leave. Such trends reinforce the (involuntary)
decision to either work or bear children, but
not to combine the two. (Wanecke 2009: 13)
Furthermore, it has proved difficult for
many women to exercise their rights to
return to their jobs after giving birth, or
even just to go on leave: “A regulation bar-
ring female teachers from maternity leave in
their first three years of service at a high
school in Shizuishan was revoked after it
was disclosed in the media” (China Daily
2014a: 2). With the recent relaxation of
the one-child policy, the working condi-
tions of mothers were highlighted as illus-
trated by the example below: “Miao
Zhiming has had a choice to make: child or
job? The 31-year-old Shanghai resident is
planning to have a second child this year…
[but that] probably means she will lose her
job” (China Daily 2014b: 1). It is expected
that many women will experience the same
dilemma, since employers are hesitant to
hire women who plan to give birth.
WHO CARES? THE CASE OF SHANGHAI
It should be stressed that reflections on
China in this article relate to urban, modern
China. This section discusses the welfare
mixture regarding care for the elderly in
the most advanced part of the country,
namely Shanghai. Of utmost importance
are the possible changes to the overall value
systems that prevail in Chinese society. Sun
and Wang (2010: 76) found that the
younger generations in Shanghai have
shifted from traditional toward more
modern values, being more secular – they
consider self-development to be more
important than making a contribution to
society – and more individualistic. Four dif-
ferent generations were asked about “Lei
Feng’s spirit”1 in order to determine
whether they were collectively or individu-
ally oriented. Among the old generation,
nearly 60 percent of the sample strongly
agreed, but only 25 percent of the younger
generation strongly agreed. However, more
surprisingly, some spiritual concerns and
traditional beliefs have persisted, chiefly in
relation to family values. In the survey, all
four generations agreed that “family is
important in people’s life.” Strongly related
to family values is the question of filial
piety. Cheung and Kwan (2009) investi-
gated this in relation to modernization in
the form of urbanization, concluding that
city-level modernization has an influence
on Chinese people’s filial piety. “The find-
ings support the notion that when Chinese
adult children take up jobs and live in
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places far away from their parents, filial
piety is reduced” (Cheung and Kwan 2009:
190, emphasis added). However, daughters
practice filial piety more than sons. 
The Chinese sociologist Yifei Shen
(2011: 20) concluded that, “it is no longer
possible to acquire dominant rights in the
household merely based on the status of
father, and a father’s power must be sup-
ported by other factors such as money or
social status…. In this sense the classic
patriarchy has already broken down.” This
leads her to talk of post-patriarchy, and to
include a perspective on generations: 
in the adult to pre-retirement cohort, two 
entirely different tendencies emerge in the 
social status of the two genders: within the
power hierarchy of 18-65-year-old males, hi-
erarchical status increases with age, whereas
in the power hierarchy of 18-65-year-old fe-
males hierarchical status decreases with age.
(Shen 2011: 20-21) 
Shen suggests that women’s powers are at
their greatest when they are young girls.
They also have a big say in their marriages,
generally more so than their boyfriends.
After marriage, men and women tend to
have relatively equal rights, but the status
of women declines with age, and by the
time a woman becomes a mother-in law,
her  powers are at their nadir. For men it is
the opposite: their powers increase with age
and length of marriage. Zhang and Goza
(2006) interviewed members of what has
been called the sandwich generation, and
they found that it is impossible for a single
child to care for two parents and four
grandparents. Hence, alternative ways of
caring for the frail and elderly must be
sought out. They praise what they label the
exemplary Shanghai model, where neighbor-
hood committee volunteers provide sup-
port for the elderly. The volunteers are
mostly young-old who then care for the
old-old.
The general assumption is that moderni-
zation leads to de-familialization, but in the
East Asian case this is more complex.
Izuhara and Forest (2013) compared three
generations of families in Shanghai and
Tokyo with reference to housing, finding
processes of both defamilialization and
refamilialization. First and foremost, they
concluded that the family is far from having
become an anachronistic institution; rather,
it remains an active domain that seeks to
maximize benefits and opportunities for all
its members. The traditional role of families
appears to be quite robust, and family sup-
port remains the dominant form of welfare
provision. Furthermore, “in urban China,
the unprecedented pace and degree of
transformation regarding housing, work
and family has been experienced by the cur-
rent middle generation. Thus, in Shanghai,
the generational gap appeared to be wider
between the middle generation and both
the younger and older generations”
(Izu-hara and Forest (2013: 535). The
authors also found that socio-economic
and policy changes supported the increas-
ing independence of older generations
from their adult children, while the recent
crisis and house price inflation was reinforc-
ing the family dependence of the younger
generation.
Sabet (2011) interviewed 21 young
people of the so-called balinhou or post-80s
generation in Shanghai and found that they
are faced with a “landscape of paradoxes”:
the co-existence of communism and a mar-
ket economy, a collectivist culture com-
bined with fierce competition and the pur-
suit of career versus the importance of
family. “They do not reject traditional
Chinese or foreign cultural influences,
[but] they do not readily embrace them
either” (Babet 2011: 549). The post-80s
generation consider themselves to be self-
determining, but within certain constraints.
Similarly, Xu and Yeung (2013) looked at
family and gender relations by examining
fathers’ involvement in their adolescent
daughters’ lives in Shanghai, and they
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found that, contrary to the stereotypical
understanding, fathers were nurturing and
greatly involved in many aspects of their
daughters’ lives. Hence, the perception of
men in Shanghai is unique because
Shanghai society currently “stresses both
traditio-nal views of male strength through
work and men’s affectionate care at home.
In Shanghai, men have a reputation of
being henpecked. A specific Shanghai term,
madasao,2 is often used to describe a typical
Shanghai man who is devoted to family
life” (Xu and Yeung 2013: 189). He is
often referred to as the “bag carrier”
because he carries his wife’s or girlfriend’s
bags when they are shopping. Based on
both a survey and interviews, the authors
con-cluded that both parent-child relations
and gender roles have become more egali-
tarian because of reforms introduced by the
Chinese Communist Party and govern-
ments since the 1950s. Since the introduc-
tion of the one-child policy, many parents
have concentrated their investment in their
only child, regardless of its gender. 
In recent years, rapid privatization and glo-
balization have greatly enhanced the value of
human capital and increased competition for
life opportunities. These social forces together
have reduced the gender bias in fathering
behavior that has been deeply rooted in tra-
ditional Chinese families and prompted
Shanghai fathers to be highly concerned with
their daughters’ academic success. (Xu and
Yeung 2013: 203)
Yet another phenomenon challenges the
traditional understanding of gender and
generation in Shanghai, namely that of
sheng nü, or “left-over women”. This refers
to highly educated, professional women
who never marry because of discrimination
in the marriage market (see the review of
Leta Hong Fincher’s book in this issue).
While the official understanding is that they
are unmarried because of their “overly high
expectations for marriage partners” (Mini-
stry of Education 2007, quoted in To
2013: 2), Sandy To (2013: 17) found in-
stead that it was the persistently formidable
nature of the Chinese patriarchal structure
that led to “discriminatory” and “control-
ling” gendered constraints that barred
most professional women from marriage: 
It was found that many of the Chinese pro-
fessional women had been rejected by their
male romantic partners and suitors because of
their strong economic accomplishments. Men
harboring “male superior norms” was seen as
main causes that rendered the highly educated
professional women “leftover” in the marriage
market (To 2013: 10).
A parallel phenomenon applies to men who
cannot find a spouse because of the biased
sex ratio in Chinese society, an unintended
consequence of the one-child policy that
has led to a situation where there are only
eighteen young women for every twenty
young men, the so-called bare branch phe-
nomenon: 
When there is a deficit of women, poor men
are not able to find wives, which can result in
the creation of bare-branch villages that suffer
from inconvenient transportation, an under-
developed economic environment and a diffi-
cult lifestyle…some wealthy communities also
experience the bare-branch phenomenon.
(Quanbao and Sánchez-Barricate 2013: 112-
113) 
Hence, traditional value systems are being
challenged, but they do to some extent
resist the challenges, leaving Chinese fami-
lies in doubt and confusion.
THE WELFARE MIX OF CARE
IN SHANGHAI
In 1998 China decided to introduce what
has been labeled socializing social welfare or
the welfare socialization reform with the
purpose of involving “social forces” in the
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delivery of social policy, which means invit-
ing the NGOs or NPOs (non-governmen-
tal or non-public organizations) onboard,
hence adopting a truly mixed welfare
approach. At the end of 2008 China had
more than 182,000 NPOs, nearly half of
which (44 %) were welfare organizations,
which “have now surpassed the state as
welfare provider of old age care in China
today” (Li and Wong 2010: 2-3). This
mixed welfare approach is well illustrated in
the case of Shanghai, where the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015) suggests a senior
care system that is largely based on home-
based care, supported by community care,
and supplemented by organization care.
The structure is characterized as “9073”,
meaning that 90 percent of the elderly
receive home-based care with the help of
family members or trained nursing workers,
7 percent receive community nursing ser-
vice, such as day-care centers and ‘meals on
wheels’ programs, while 3 percent rely on
nursing homes. The plan places consider-
able importance on long-term care at
home, yet there are few trained nurses or
nurse’s aides available on the market to
work in homes (Shanghai Daily 2012: B2).
Table 1. Senior care organizations 
(nursing homes) in Shanghai in 2011
                   Organizations             Beds
Public                  33                     9,070
Community         263                   39,633
Private                 335                   53,193
Total                    631                   101,896
Source: Shanghai Daily (2012: B2)      
This breakdown is unfortunate since public
nursing homes are by far the most popular
of these in general rather unpopular forms
of elderly care. The public ones are rela-
tively affordable, and the older generation
trusts public organizations more than pri-
vate ones. Furthermore, private solutions
are only relevant for an affluent minority
because of their high costs, which show up
in the high vacancy rates within this sector. 
China Senior Care, which is building a 64-
bed acute-care facility in Hangzhou, plans to
charge at least 40,000 renminbi, or $6,300,
per month, putting the facility far out of
reach for all but the wealthiest in China…
At Cherish-Yearn, an upscale retirement com-
munity on the outskirts of Shanghai, Chair-
man Xi Zhiyong has invested 600 million
renminbi to build 800 apartments, with a
little more than 60 percent of them full
(New York Times 2012). 
This judgment is widespread: “In
Shanghai, the government-owned nursing
homes, which are more affordable, are all
full, and those on the waiting list need to
wait for over five years before having a
chance to enter” (Kleinman 2012). A simi-
lar situation also prevails in Chongqing:
“After a few years of development of pri-
vately owned nursing homes, about 140
such facilities were opened in Chongqing.
A few soon filled up, typically with wealthier
aged residents, but over half of the nursing
homes cannot get enough customers or
face bankruptcy” (ibid.).
To support home care, Shanghai has
introduced day-care centers for citizens
over 65. There are now 326 such centers
across the city, which is an increase from
the year before of 8 percent (Shanghai
Daily 2012: B2). These rely, at least to
some extent, on co-operation with volun-
tary organizations such as the Hands On:
“Hands On volunteers engage the elderly
in fun activities to enliven the elders’ daily
schedules. Volunteers will play BINGO and
mahjong, assist with rehabilitation classes,
teach English, keep up the garden, and
engage in a lot of very interesting conversa-
tions” (Hands On Shanghai 2013). These
activities, which are provided by volunteers,
are additional to services such as daily
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meals and physical check-ups. Shanghai
plans to build another twenty day-care cen-
ters for the elderly and forty sites for
delivering meals to them in residential
complexes by the end of 2013 (China
Daily 2013).
CARING IN COPENHAGEN
This section focuses on care of the elderly
in Denmark as an illustration of the rela-
tionships between the welfare regime and
the gender and generation regimes. Every
Danish citizen is entitled to services free of
charge if they are in need, and both men
and women have access to the public old
age pension system when they turn age 65
(67) regardless of their private economic
status. Both social care services and the
public old-age pension are financed
through taxes. On the one hand, the sys-
tem of care services is decentralized with
the legal responsibility for providing the
elderly with both practical and personal
help placed at the local government level.
It is the municipalities that pay for the ser-
vices through local taxes and block grants
from the state, set the standards of help
and decide how much help a person is
entitled to, based on individual needs. The
pension system, on the other hand, is cen-
tralized, with national standards regulating
the size of public old age pensions etc. 
The aim of the help offered is to allow
elderly people to stay in their own homes as
long as possible and to protect them from
declining physical and mental health. This
means helping people in their own homes
even when they need help to clean the
house or get out of bed in the morning.
Today around 200,000 people receive per-
manent home-care services, with between
1.0 and 1.1 million care hours being deliv-
ered every week to 25% of all citizens aged
67 and older. The local council is required
to set up and publish so-called quality stan-
dards. It must not only provide informa-
tion about its services, but also ensure that
citizens are fully informed about their
rights in relation to the local authority. The
quality of the standards and the actual ser-
vices provided for the elderly must meet
the requirements conditioned in the laws
governing social services (Ministry of Social
Affairs and Integration 2013).
A large-scale reform of housing for the
elderly was implemented in 1988. Before
that year, residential accommodation for
the elderly was thought of as “old people’s
homes.” The basic principle of the reform
was on the one hand to make it possible for
the elderly to stay in their own homes for
as long as possible. On the other hand, it
was also intended to increase the standards
of residential accommodation. Today, there
are many different types of housing in
Denmark: the family home, close-care
accommodation, private nursing homes
and in the coming years a new type called
friplejeboliger (private nursing homes/pri-
vate dwellings). As with home care services,
it is the municipalities that determine
whether a citizen requires the kind of help
that cannot be given in the private home. If
a citizen is offered residential accommoda-
tion, she or he can decide between the dif-
ferent alternatives in the municipality or
even move to another municipality. In
2006 there were around 90,000 homes
suitable for the elderly, of which 45,000
provided round-the-clock services from
permanent staff. A care home guarantee
has been granted since 2009, so that citi-
zens eligible for nursing homes will have to
wait no more than two months for a place
to stay (Ministry of Social Affairs and
Integration 2013).
Ideally, the Scandinavian welfare regime
has relieved the younger generations, espe-
cially younger women, from the “burden”
of care for the elderly. But in reality, the
insufficiency in collective care arrangements
has led to a situation in which civil-society
actors such as family members, neighbors
and NGOs have had to fill the gaps.
Hence, the municipality of Copenhagen is
GENDER AND WELFARE REGIMES REVISED 75
currently reacting to the increasing number
of frail elderly by reducing the total num-
ber of hours allocated to home help and
help in old age from 13,060 hours to
12,700 hours at a time when the number
of recipients has increased from 53,200 to
56,000, resulting in fewer elderly people
receiving help (Statistics Copenhagen
2013). Table 2 demonstrates how the pub-
lic sector is nonetheless still providing two-
thirds of the total amount of elderly care in
Copenhagen.
The administrative reform of 2007
strengthened the municipal dimension of
elderly care, first, by giving the responsibi-
lity for rehabilitative and preventive mea-
sures to the municipalities, and secondly, by
providing financial incentives for the muni-
cipalities to establish rehabilitation and pre-
vention programmes. In other words, in
this case practices were implemented that
conform to the discourse of economic effi-
ciency and, at the same time, reproduce
them when it comes to rehabilitation in
elderly care. Thus, the strong emphasis on
economic efficiency on the part of local
policy actors makes sense (Fersch 2012:
14).
Sjørup furthermore talks about a “four-
generation society”, meaning two groups
of elderly, the young and the old: 60-74
and 75-108; and the young, 0-24, and
working age generations, 25-59 (Sjørup
2010: 18). The care problem refers particu-
larly to the very old as those needing care,
and to the middle generation as those sup-
posed to deliver some care. Sjørup (2010:
14) states that “the overall shift in policies
of elderly care for the last 10 years has been
the shift from the social democratic model
of welfare as a complex of rights for a cer-
tain age group to the policy of New Public
Management.” This observation we also
find in Jensen and Fersch (2011: 2) when
they write: “As in other European coun-
tries, the elderly care reform in Denmark
was inspired by liberal and libertarian
values, epitomized as the ‘freedom of
choice’…. This constructed them as con-
sumers of welfare services.” They conclude: 
Because there is no real competition over
price, the only incentive for care receivers to
choose a private instead of a public provider
are, first, that clients feel more comfortable
with a private rather than a public provider of
care, and, secondly, that private providers,
contrary to public providers, are allowed to
offer additional services (Jensen and Fersch
2011: 11). 
Pernille Hohnen (2011: 1) agrees with this
reasoning and qualifies the conclusions
when she states: 
Privatization in Danish elderly care has gene-
rally not taken place as outsourcing to one or
more private providers based on a competi-
tion of price and quality. Instead, most muni-
cipalities have opted for the fixed-price
arrangement, inviting private suppliers to
provide the care in a free-choice system,
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Table 2. Sources of care for the elderly in Copenhagen
Source of care                                  Home care (% share)         Institutional care (% share)
Family and/or friends                                     10                                     n.a.
Not-for-profit organizations                            0                                       0
Public authorities                                            62                                     100
Private carers/for-profit firms                          28                                     0
Source: Sjørup 2010. 
where elderly receivers of care are entitled
to choose between providers that have been
accredited by the municipality. (Hohnen
2011: 2)
Furthermore, “the tendency has been for
municipalities to separate practical care
(cleaning) from personal care – and to have
private companies provide the larger part of
practical care, keeping most personal care
provision within the municipal care units”
(ibid.). Thus, with respect to elderly care,
Denmark is moving away from the ideal-
typical Scandinavian regime towards one
influenced more by the Conservative and
Liberal regimes.
CONCLUSION: COMPARING WELFARE
COMBINATIONS IN CARE FOR THE
ELDERLY IN CHINA AND DENMARK
The frail elderly need to both be provided
and cared for, and even when the state has
taken formal responsibility for this, the
actual delivery of support and care may
very well come from the market for those
who can afford it – that is, a rich minority –
from the family, which very often means
daughters and daughter’s-in-law, from the
community in the form of NPOs and
NGOs, or from the state, meaning both
central and local government. In both the
Chinese and Danish cases all sectors of the
welfare diamond are involved in the care
and support of elderly citizens, but in
Denmark the public sector is much more
involved than is the case in China. How-
ever, as in China, the Danish local state
mostly provides home care. Only four per-
cent of Danes aged 65 or over are in an
old-age home (NOSOSKO 2013: 133),
and as we have seen China aims at three
percent, thus creating a quite similar situa-
tion. But when it comes to home care,
while China wants to leave 90 percent of
the elderly to their families, in Denmark
that share is “only” 38 percent. 
Furthermore, private alternatives are
more widespread in China, indicating a
higher degree of differentiation and pos-
sible polarization along class lines. The
continued strong reliance on family sup-
port and care in China poses serious chal-
lenges along the lines of gender and gene-
ration. It is first and foremost women
within families who are expected to provide
care, while the support burden is shared
between husband and wife in the younger
generations, that is, precisely those genera-
tions that are facing the toughest dilemmas
in contemporary China. The traditional
intergenerational support system is being
challenged by new norms, new spatial
distributions and women’s formal engage-
ment in labor market and careers, plus the
fact that there are relatively few women in
the younger cohorts due to the one-child
policy. Greater public responsibility and
involvement is one answer, as the Danish
case demonstrates, but this presupposes a
willingness to pay much higher taxes than
is presently the case in China.
It seems that the very different welfare
regimes of Scandinavia and China are con-
verging towards a model of a welfare com-
bination within an overall framework of
universalism. Ideally, this is the best of all
worlds, but in reality it poses challenges
along the parameters of class, gender,
generation and ethnicity. However, unlike
earlier times, while class and gender remain
important, the most important line of con-
flict now revolves around generation.
NOTES
1. Lei Feng was a soldier who died on duty in the
1960s during the Great Leap Forward. He was
idealized by the Chinese authorities as an ideal
typical collectively oriented person through pic-
tures, film clips and later extracts from his diary,
the authenticity of which has been questioned. 
2. “Ma da sao is Shanghai slang, meaning, ‘shop,
wash, cook.’ Because sao (cook) has the same pro-
nunciation as the word for an older woman, when 
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Chinese hear the term “ma da sao,” they usually
picture a housewife. The exception is when the
term is used to describe men in Shanghai – guys
who don’t just shop, wash and cook, but famously
do so without complaint” (He 2011).
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